895.00/2–1849: Telegram

The Chargé of the American Mission in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

secret

154. Deptel 88, February 10.1 We have noted G–2 reports as well as similar information appearing recent issue weekly organ northwest youth groups. However, we without confirmation such reports, regard them as speculative and treat them with utmost reserve.

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In our opinion, Soviets have fashioned their North Korean creature in typical Communist monolithic disciplined mould and that in circumstances there is virtually no scope for deviation from Soviet desiderata, however minute these may be. Kim II Sung,2 Stalin’s prototype in North Korea has been carefully nurtured by Soviets, has been sedulously built up a Korean “hero” and is in our opinion completely subservient and loyal to Soviet Union. Moreover, Kim is undoubtedly closely watched and controlled by Soviet MVD agents and by Soviet “Ambassador” who was formerly Soviet Military Commander in North Korea.3 As for Pak Hun Yong, Kim Moo Jung, Kim Do Bong, et cetera while these North Korean leaders have different backgrounds from that of Kim II Sung, it is difficult to believe they entertain basic views or policies in conflict with those of Kim II Sung or his Soviet masters. If latter leaders should entertain such divergent views, they could be expected to become known to Soviets far easier than to Americans here in South Korea with result we could expect purges which normal lot of Communist dissidents. In this connection, it is to be pointed out no leading North Korean Communists have defected during past three years. And with Communist tide now running high in east Asia, there seemingly less inducement than ever for North Korean Communist leaders to reflect views or adopt positions which deviate from those laid down by Kremlin.

With specific regard to question of unity, record of past three years reflects clearly in our view, Soviet position on how Korean unity should be achieved. Our [Their?] concept of Korean unity, as we see it, is creation by any and all means of Soviet controlled Korean Communist state. Soviets would, of course, prefer to accomplish their objective without bloodshed, but if that not possible Soviets quite willing in our opinion to plunge Korea into abyss of civil war. Hence at present Soviets utilizing North Korean stooges in endeavor foment disruption and chaos South Korea. As adjuncts to these tactics, Soviets have openly spurned UN efforts reach peaceful settlement Korean issue, use every method in their bag of tricks to vilify and blacken representatives of Korea and its leaders and pursue every means to get us out of South Korea. In all these efforts and activities North Koreans, are as we view situation, largely abject tools of Russians. In our opinion, any advocacy by North Korean leaders of peaceful means of obtaining Korean unity would only be tolerated by Soviet masters if latter felt such means best calculated to accomplish Soviet aims. Record to date suggests Soviets and their North Korean stooges unwilling have anything to do with UNCOK on question Korean unity or anything else. However, we do not rule out possibility Soviets may [Page 963]yet order North Koreans to make contact with UNCOK if Soviets feel such action might prove advantageous to their aim of “unifying” Korea.

Drumright
  1. Not printed. It requested the Mission’s comments on reports of divergent views among North Korean leaders concerning Korean unification (895.00/2–1049).
  2. Premier of the Democratic Peopled Republic of Korea.
  3. Col. Gen. Terenty F. Shtykov.